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Slower growth of the labour force and an increase in old-age dependency will reduce the 
growth of aggregate output and output per capita in many developed countries. However, a 
major question is whether there is any systematic link between demographics and the 
productivity of those who will still be active during the up-coming period of demographic 
ageing. As productivity is difficult to investigate at a micro level, the paper builds on a large 
macro-data panel covering developed as well as developing countries and explores the impact 
of the age composition of the labour force on levels and growth rates of output per worker as 
well as on total factor productivity (TFP). The results confirm earlier findings by Feyrer 
(2007), pointing to an inversely U-shaped relationship between the share of workers in 
different age groups and productivity which mainly works through the TFP channel and is 
effectively much stronger than what can be observed at a micro level. In-depths analyses 
suggest that cohort effects in human-capital accumulation may contribute to this pattern, but 
do not explain it. The paper concludes with simulations for a number of OECD countries 
showing that the impact of projected ageing of the labour force on productivity and per-capita 
growth could be really substantial in some cases. 
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th century, there has been a secular decline in fertility rates in virtually all 
industrialized countries, with the number of births mostly falling below a “replacement 
level” during the last three decades. A parallel, strong increase in longevity adds to the 
picture of demographic ageing as a current mega-trend. However, continuing reductions 
in age-specific mortality rates now mainly relate to years of age in which individuals are 
clearly beyond their active life span. As a result, most developed countries will be faced 
with a considerable slow-down in growth, in many cases even a decline, in their labour 
force. With an increasing share of older individuals, changes in total population growth 
tend to move in the same direction, but will be far less pronounced. 
  The economic implications of these changes are of first-order significance. Never-
theless, disputes about many of the potential consequences are still unsettled. For exam-
ple, surprisingly little is actually known regarding the impact of large shifts in the age 
composition of the labour force on productivity growth. Meanwhile, it is easy to see that 
the productivity of those who will still be active during the up-coming period of overt 
demographic ageing is really one of the key issues arising in this context. Conventional 
economic wisdom points to a number of diverging effects, but does not offer any unam-
biguous conclusions regarding their net impact. In a recent paper, Feyrer (2007) has 
come up with empirical results regarding a link between labour-force demographics and 
total factor productivity (TFP) that appear to be so strong and robust that they are hard 
to believe but ought to be taken seriously. In this paper, I will reconstruct Feyrer’s 
analysis from scratch and try to extend it in several ways. First, in the empirical work I 
will add ten more years of data which are taken from a period, 1991 to 2000, when eco-
nomic growth was more business as usual in many countries than in the early post-war 
period until well into the 1960s. Second, I will look at the role of cohort effects in hu-
man-capital accumulation for the impact of demographics on TFP and TFP growth.  
  The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will browse through the body of 
existing literature, discussing the main observations that have been made regarding the 
relationship between population growth and fertility on the one hand and economic per-
formance on the other. In Section 3, I restate Feyrer’s simple macroeconomic model of 
how the age composition of the labour force might affect productivity. Section 4 reports 
on procedures and results of an empirical assessment of the model, based on a large 
macro-data panel spanning a long time series and covering developed as well as devel-  2
oping countries. Section 5 concludes with some illustrative simulations, also comment-
ing on promising paths for future research in this area. 
 
 
2  Productivity and demographic ageing: ideas and observations 
2.1 Participation, dependency, and “capital deepening” in standard growth theory 
Neglecting the age composition of the labour force and concentrating on its size, a con-
ventional neoclassical growth model predicts a negative “participation effect” on aggre-
gate output, a negative “dependency effect” on output per capita, and an increase in out-
put per worker – i.e., in labour productivity – through “capital deepening” if the growth 
rate of the labour force diminishes and the dependency ratio increases. The first of these 
effects is of little importance, and the second is relevant, but largely inevitable. The im-
pact of demographic change on productivity should actually be the key concern but, at 
closer inspection, capital deepening alone turns out to be a rather weak counter-effect. 
  To see all this, assume for an instant that the growth rate of output per worker – i.e., 
productivity growth – were exogenously given, hence entirely unaffected by demo-
graphic ageing. If the number of individuals who engage in production grows at a lower 
rate than in the past, the growth rate of aggregate output will slow down correspond-
ingly. Of course, one need not really worry about this reduction in economic growth 
along its “extensive” margin; one may simply have to get used to smaller growth fig-
ures. What is more important is that “intensive” growth of per-capita output, which is 
sometimes used as a rough indicator of individual well-being, is also likely to decline. 
The reason is that, whatever the precise trends, the growth rate of total population will 
usually not decelerate as much as that of the working-age population, and the share of 
the population that is economically inactive will go up substantially. Both these effects 
that are straightforward from the simple arithmetic of growth figure prominently in a 
number of recent simulation exercises regarding the economic consequences of demo-
graphic ageing.
1 Yet, in themselves, they contain little economics. 
  Things are different with respect to capital deepening, or (inverse) “capital dilution” 
as it was traditionally termed when the labour force was growing almost everywhere. In 
the standard neoclassical growth model suggested by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), 
output per worker is co-determined by the capital–labour ratio, and the saving rate is 
taken to be exogenous. If, in such an environment, the labour force starts growing more 
                                            
1   See, for example, Martins et al. (2005) or European Commission (2005). There, the focus is on ways 
to increase labour-force participation to counter the wide-spread downward trend in the working-age 
population. In case this can be accomplished, there will be a positive effect for aggregate and per-
capita growth, but the results are still mainly governed by the simple rule of proportion applied above.   3
slowly than it did before, the immediate response in the capital stock is limited to a less 
than proportional decline in its growth rate which becomes stronger and stronger until 
the rate of capital accumulation has aligned to the growth rate of the labour force. Dur-
ing this entire transition period and also in the final steady state, there is thus more capi-
tal per worker than with a higher rate of labour-force growth, and labour productivity 
increases. In terms of aggregate output, however, the negative participation effect of 
slower growth of the labour force always dominates the (second-order) effect of capital 
deepening. In terms of output per capita, one would have to make highly unrealistic 
assumptions regarding the parallel change in total population growth for the overall 
effect to be neutral, let alone positive. Last but not least, capital deepening as such could 
be weakened, but also reinforced, if the saving rate were not exogenous as it is in the 
neoclassical standard model, but determined endogenously by individuals who optimize 
their life-time consumption profile.
2 
 
2.2 The empirical evidence thus far 
Most of the empirical work on economic growth done prior to the 1990s is now clearly 
out-dated, due to improvements in both econometric methodology and data availability 
that have been achieved since then. Brandner and Dowrick (1994) are thus the first to 
investigate the impact of demographics on economic performance, specifically on per-
capita output and per-capita growth, in an up-to-date fashion for a large panel of devel-
oped and developing countries. Building on the Solow–Swan model and using popula-
tion growth as the relevant regressor, they find that, to the extent that they can isolate it, 
the capital-deepening effect is weak and insignificant. Effectively lumping together the 
participation and dependency effects, they find a much stronger impact of the working-
age share of population which is both positive and significant. The role of investment 
for output and growth is also positive and significant, as one should expect. Yet, the 
most important source of variation in output and growth appears to be a productivity 
indicator taken to reflect the current stage of technological progress in each country. 
  In a more recent paper, Ahituv (2001) uses an augmented model which includes 
variables reflecting average qualifications of workers, i.e., human capital accumulation. 
He concentrates on capital deepening and dependency effects as the two main channels 
for how demographics could affect output per capita in an even larger panel of coun-
tries. Using fertility rates instead of total population growth as a regressor, he finds the 
                                            
2   In a model with endogenous saving, the impact of a declining labour force on the aggregate saving rate 
is truly ambiguous. Heuristically, there are two opposing effects: individuals may save less as an in-
creasing capital–labour ratio puts the rate of return under pressure; they may as well save more to keep 
up consumption at old age. Ultimately, this is a matter of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
between consumption at different ages (Werding 2007, Appendix A.1), hence an empirical question.   4
former effect to be significant. Still, his estimates suggest that the latter channel is more 
important in explaining a negative effect of high fertility on output per capita. Like 
Brandner and Dowrick (1994), Ahituv (2001) looks at contemporaneous relationships 
only – i.e., effects of current fertility rates on current economic performance
3 – thus 
neglecting long-term consequences of changes in fertility for economic growth that are 
currently moving to the fore and should therefore rank high on the research agenda. 
  An important step in this direction is taken by Lindh and Malmberg (1999) who are 
the first to investigate the idea that, in developed countries, there may be an impact of 
the age composition of the population, which is mainly shaped by past birth rates, on the 
growth rate of output per worker. Their results indicate that, controlling for net invest-
ment and labour-force growth within an overall model of transitional growth with grad-
ual adjustments of technology, there is a significant positive effect of the share of those 
who are currently aged 50–64 years. The share of elderly people (aged 65 and over) has 
a significant negative effect on productivity growth, while younger age groups have 
ambiguous and largely insignificant effects. Perhaps, one of the main shortcomings of 
their study is that the demographic variables used by Lindh and Malmberg (1999) relate 
to total population, not to the working-age population or the labour force, and therefore 
do not allow for stronger conclusions regarding the precise mechanisms at work. 
  Another study dealing with effects of the age composition on productivity and pro-
ductivity growth that uses data relating to both population and labour force is provided 
by Feyrer (2007). Building on a human-capital augmented growth model and a conven-
tional growth-accounting approach (Solow 1957), his main interest lies with the impact 
of demographics on the state and dynamics of technological progress, or “total factor 
productivity”, which has often been found to be very important for explaining actual 
growth processes, respectively, their variation across countries and over time.
4. His 
analyses relate to up to 87 developed as well as to developing countries, and his data set 
spans the period from 1960 to 1990. His major finding is an inversely U-shaped rela-
tionship between changes in the age structure of the labour force and the growth rate of 
TFP which peaks for workers aged 40–49. Furthermore, this pattern is very pronounced, 
much stronger in fact than anything that can be observed at the micro level, and it ap-
pears to be robust against numerous modifications that are meant to detect any biases. 
  There is also a number of other recent papers, such as Bloom et al. (2007), which 
demonstrate a growing interest in the link between demographics and economic growth 
in general. Yet, the positive relationship that they find between growth of per-capita 
                                            
3   Therefore, Ahituv (2001) also tests for reverse causality, concluding that the negative relation between 
fertility and output per capita is effectively the result of bi-directional dependence. 
4   For an extensive survey of empirical work that backs this conclusion, see Easterly and Levine (2000).   5
output and changes in the overall activity rate (i.e., 1 – total dependency ratio) should 
not be surprising, simply due to the definition of both these variables. 
 
2.3 Age-related productivity differentials 
Another strand of the literature stresses that a given worker’s productivity could sys-
tematically differ over his or her active period of life for reasons such as differences in 
experience, depreciation of knowledge or age-related trends in physical and mental ca-
pabilities. Based on the link between productivity and wages, this is often illustrated 
using micro-level estimates of Mincerian wage equations (Mincer 1974) which measure 
life-cycle profiles of individual wage rates, usually differentiated by gender, as a func-
tion of educational attainments, job experience or age (allowing for non-linear effects) 
and a number of socio-economic background characteristics. Typically, these profiles 
exhibit a strong increase until workers are in their 40s and a moderate decline toward 
the end of the working life. Consequently, if the number of older workers increases vis-
à-vis that of prime-aged workers, there could be a reduction in average productivity. 
  There are several objections to interpreting Mincer-type wage profiles as indicating 
age-related differences in productivity. First, in estimates based on cross-section data, 
seemingly age-related trends may effectively be due to cohort effects arising from 
changes in educational behaviour over time. Levels of qualification are explicitly con-
trolled for in the estimation, yet this may not fully remove the distortion. Second, life-
cycle profiles of wages may effectively reflect seniority rules of pay which have little, if 
anything, to do with age-related patterns of productivity. Furthermore, using data that 
appear to be suited to avoid these two problems, Börsch-Supan (2003) demonstrates 
that, to the extent that they show up in individual wage earnings, age-specific productiv-
ity differentials are unlikely to have more than negligible effects for the time path of 
average productivity.
5 Even under extreme assumptions regarding the size of these dif-
ferentials, he finds that changes in the age distribution of the labour force projected for 
Germany until 2050 – where these changes are rather strong – may reduce productivity 
growth only by up to 0.15 percentage points per year. 
 An  important  caveat with respect to all kinds of micro-level approaches in this area 
is that productivity (and its life-cycle profile) is not, at least not fully, an individual 
                                            
5   Börsch-Supan (2003) looks at the structure of two different earnings profiles relating to the employees 
of a major service company in the US (taken from Kotlikoff and Wise 1989), a genuinely longitudinal 
profile for salesmen whose pay is mainly performance-related and an artificial profile for salarymen 
who are newly hired at different ages. The restriction to new hires is meant to neutralize the effects of 
seniority remuneration which may be highly relevant for salaried workers. It turns out that both pro-
files exhibit more variation than simple cross-section results and that the profile for salaried workers 
shows an even stronger decline of earnings at higher ages than that for salesmen. This may be partly 
due to a selection effect between those who stay in a job and those who have to find a new employer.   6
characteristic. Rather, it is the outcome of a complex interaction with other workers and 
other factors of production which takes place within a certain economic environment 
constituted by the available technology, public infrastructure, characteristics of a given 
firm and sector, and many other things beside. This definitely needs to be taken into 
account when assessing the impact of changes in the size and the composition of the 
labour force on aggregate economic performance. Therefore, Mincerian wage profiles 
may not convey all that matters here, and one may indeed have to employ the rough 
tools of macroeconomic theory to address the impact of demographic change on eco-
nomic performance and, specifically, productivity growth. 
 
3  A macroeconomic model 
The basic idea which is further investigated in this paper is the one already pursued by 
Lindh and Malmberg (1999) as well as Feyrer (2007), viz. that labour productivity and 
its growth could be influenced by the age structure of the labour force. From the litera-
ture on age-related productivity differentials (see Section 2.3), one can already infer that 
such effects may not so much affect productivity that is directly attributable to individ-
ual workers and can be rewarded in terms of wages. Instead, they may mainly work via 
total factor productivity, i.e., technological progress and technology dissemination. 
  To formalize this idea closely following Feyrer (2007), let us start from a Cobb–
Douglas variant of a neoclassical production function, augmenting it with a variable h 
representing human capital per worker, or the “quality of labour”, and assuming techno-
logical progress, measured by a parameter A, to be “labour-augmenting”. As the model 
will be tested using annual data for a large number of countries, we may also add a 
country index i and a time index t. 
    α α − = 1 ) ( it it it it it L h A K Y  (1) 
To be sure, none of these are novel features. Equation (1) is essentially taken from Hall 
and Jones (1999). Taking into account human capital is important as there is a lot of 
variation across countries and over time in this variable, a major drawback for many 
older studies being that this has not been measurable in a reliable fashion. The assump-
tion that technological progress is labour-augmenting, or “Harrod-neutral”, is necessary 
for the model to have a steady state (Uzawa 1961). The assumption that the production 
function is Cobb–Douglas reconciles this definition with the alternative one of techno-
logical progress being “Hicks-neutral” which is needed for growth accounting to be 
applicable.
6 
                                            
6   Technological progress is said to be labour-augmenting, or Harrod-neutral (with reference to Harrod 
1942), if it does not affect the output shares of capital and labour for a given capital-output ratio. It is   7
  Re-writing (1) in terms of output per worker, q = Y/L, and re-arranging yields 
    it it it it it it it h A h A k q ) 1 /( 1 ) ( α α α α κ − − = = , (2) 
with the capital coefficient κ = K/Y = k/q. Taking natural logarithms leads to a linear 
decomposition by which A can be isolated. The result is 








Calculating first differences, one obtains (exponential) growth rates of A and the other 
variables, based on ln (xt/xt–1) = ln xt – ln xt–1 ≡ ∆ ln xt (and ln 1 = 0), whereby 
    it it it it h q A ln ln
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Equations (3) and (4) can be seen as prescriptions of how to calculate TFP both in levels 
and growth rates based on data regarding Y, K, L and h, thereby controlling for the role 
of pure factor accumulation for output and productivity growth. Bearing in mind that A 
is often found to be the most important driver of economic growth, one can then go 
ahead and subject the measures obtained for ln A and ∆ ln A to further examination. 
  Again following Feyrer (2007), I then assume that q is influenced – mainly through 
the TFP parameter A – by the age composition of the labour force, implying that the 
latter may have an impact on TFP levels, while changes in the age composition of the 
active population may then affect TFP growth. The age composition of the labour force 
is therefore represented by an index, Λ, with 







where Ls is the share of age group s in the total labour force. Inserting (5) in (3) and (4) 
via the assumption that A = γ Λ yields a decomposition of the TFP residual, 
    , ln ln ln ln ∑ + = + =
s
sit s it it it it L Λ A β γ γ  (6) 
or, in terms of first differences, 
                                                                                                                                
called “Hicks-neutral” (after Hicks 1932) if, as in Y = T K
α
 L
1–α, it does not affect the ratio of marginal 
productivities of capital and labour for a given capital-labour ratio. 
  Note that the definitions of Hicks-neutrality and Harrod-neutrality are not mutually exclusive. How-
ever, they can only be met simultaneously with a production function that exhibits a constant unit elas-
ticity of substitution. Furthermore, a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function (where the sum 
of all partial output elasticities is unity and the output shares of all factors of production are simply 
constant) is the only functional form fulfilling this condition. To see the equivalence, simply assume 
that the TFP measure A included in (1) is related to T by the monotonic transformation A = T
1/(1–α).   8
    , ln ln ∑ ∆ + ∆ = ∆
s
sit s it it L A β γ  (7) 
which easily lend themselves as testable hypotheses. To obtain regression equations, 
one simply has to split ln γit into a constant γ (that disappears when differencing), a 
time-invariant country fixed effect λi, and a pure time trend µt, and add an error term εit. 
  Note that the assumption of the TFP residual A being a function of (the structure of) 
L, makes the theoretical model come close to a model of endogenous growth in the tra-
dition of Lucas (1988) and Uzawa (1965), with human capital as an engine of TFP 
growth. This observation raises two issues. First, an endogenous-growth setting which 
implies that there are super-linearities linked to one of the production factors entering 
the F(⋅)-functional would be at odds with the application of the basic growth-accounting 
framework which is necessary to measure A in the first place. A way out of this di-
lemma is to interpret the model as a model of transitional growth (following Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1995), such that the TFPs measured for each country would not reflect 
genuine technological progress (“inventions”), but the current state of technology adop-
tion (“innovation”). In a process of universal convergence, all countries were then mov-
ing towards the uniform production possibilities frontier from different starting points 
and at different speeds, while the frontier itself would not depend on the age composi-
tion of the labour force. Alternatively, one could simply accept the internal inconsis-
tency of the theoretical model, as there is no other way to isolate A, and take it to yield 
an imperfect test on whether there is genuine endogenous growth linked to the structure 
of L – a conclusion which would not be supported empirically, as we will see. Second, 
having gone this far, one may wonder whether the human capital of workers should not 
also play a role for levels and changes in A. I will further look into this feature in Sec-
tion 4.2, after estimating the model in its current form and discussing the results. 
  From a technical point of view, the model suggested here for empirical testing has a 
number of nice features. The age-structure variables which are considered the main de-
terminants of TFP and TFP growth are not likely to be endogenously linked by the de-
pendent variables, as they are essentially determined by decisions taken some 20 to 60 
years ago.
7 This avoids problems regarding the direction of causality that are notorious 
with respect to many other potential determinants of output or output growth, such as 
trade, investment, education, political institutions, etc. Also, unlike other variables that 
are plausibly exogenous, such as geographical characteristics, demographic variables 
not only exhibit variation across countries but also considerable time-series variation, at 
least in the industrialized world. Serial correlation, another potential problem that typi-
                                            
7   This is certainly true with respect to past fertility rates and their impact on today’s age structure of the 
labour force, probably less so with respect to migration. I will return to these qualifications later on.   9
cally plagues time-series analyses of the determinants of output, is naturally being dealt 
with in this set-up when switching to first differences, not as a technical response but as 
a variant of the model which has a material interpretation. Provided it exists in the level-
estimates based on equation (6), the problem of serial correlation is also mitigated by 
the fact that I effectively use data collected at 5-year intervals. 
  Building on Feyrer (2007), I will mainly look at the role of the age composition of 
the labour force for TFP and TFP growth. However, the work by Brandner and Dowrick 
(1994) or Ahituv (2001) suggests that changes in demographic variables may also affect 
saving and investment, hence the entire time path of the physical capital stock (see Sec-
tion 2.2). Similar things may apply to the stock of human capital. Estimates regarding 
the role of demographic change for economic growth could therefore be biased if these 
alternative channels were not taken into account. To check whether this potential bias 
exists, and also to determine the relative importance of the impact on TFP, running ad-
ditional regressions regarding the impact on the broader productivity measure q and 
∆ q and on any of the components of equations (3) and (4) may thus be useful. 
 
4  Data and estimates 
4.1 Demographics, TFP and TFP growth 
The data base which has been set up for this study spans a time frame from 1960 to 
2000, at 5-year intervals, and covers up to 106 countries, among them 27 OECD coun-
tries which are taken to represent the developed world.
8 As both growth experience and 
current demographic trends in most developed countries differ from those in the rest of 
the world, I look at the larger “all-countries” panel including as many observations as 
possible to avoid a selection bias, but I will run separate regressions for the OECD 
countries to see whether they show any peculiarities. 
  The estimates rely to a great deal on measures and procedures that have been devel-
oped in recent empirical growth research. Throughout, I up-date data used in earlier 
work and re-construct all transformations from scratch. Specifically, the productivity 
measure  it q  that serves as a starting point for calculating the TFP residual is output per 
worker as constructed in the Penn World Tables (“PWT 6.2”, Heston et al. 2006). Capi-
tal per worker  it k  is calculated applying a “perpetual-inventory” method to PWT 6.2 
data following Easterly and Levine (2000),
9 and κit is simply defined as kit / qit. Human 
                                            
8   For a list of the countries covered, see Appendix A.1. 
9   The value of the initial capital stock per worker is estimated to be i / (g + δ) q0; the investment share i is 
calculated as a 10-year average from 1960 onward (later if data become available only later); “steady-
state” growth g is calculated as a weighted 10-year average of the economy’s aggregate growth rate 
and the world growth rate of aggregate output; the depreciation rate δ is assumed to be 7 %; and initial 
output per worker q0 is a 3-year average (for further details, see Easterly and Levine 2000, footnote 3).   10
capital per worker is measured as  ) ( it s
it e h φ = , following Hall and Jones (1999) and 
using data on educational attainments provided by Barro and Lee (2001) and on returns 
to schooling provided by Psacharopoulos (1994).
10 Based on evidence from a host of 
international studies, capital’s share of output, α, is simply assumed to be 1/3 (see, e.g., 
Gollin 2002). The age composition of the labour force is measured by the relative size 
of 10-year age groups (L10–19, L20–29, etc., representing the share of those aged 10–
19, 20–29, etc. in the active population). Data are taken from the ILO’s (2007) LA-
BORSTA database, where they are available at 10-year intervals. To run estimates 
based on 5-year intervals, missing values are imputed using data on the age structure of 
total population that are provided by the UN Population Division (2006). 
  The results of a first series of estimates that are based on equation (6), essentially 
replicating Feyrer’s (2007) analysis, are summarized in Table 1.
11 Here, the dependent 
variable is the TFP residual in levels; TFP growth will be looked at in the next step. 
Specifications that differ from Model 1 (“M 1”) to Model 6 (“M 6”) are meant to ex-
plore, first, how much additional structure is needed for a simple regression of the TFP 
term on the L-variables to yield meaningful results and, second, how robust these results 
are with respect to alternative estimation procedures. M 1 is a simple OLS regression, 
with all the available data simply pooled together, while M 2 adds country dummies and 
M 3, in addition, time dummies.
12 Allowing for country-specific effects contributes sub-
stantially to shaping results regarding the age-structure variables L10–19 through L60+. 
(L40–49 is omitted from the regression and serves as a reference group, the coefficients 
for the other L-variables measuring effects relative to those of this prime-aged group of 
workers.) Introducing time dummies further modifies the pattern of the L-coefficients, 
but does not change their structure altogether. 
  To understand the progress from M 1 to M 3 more fully, it is important to keep in 
mind what the inclusion of time and country-specific effects implies in the present 
framework. Note, first of all, that all cross-country differences in output and productiv-
ity that are due to differences in investment in physical and human capital should al-
ready have been taken into account when calculating the TFP residual. The estimates 
therefore focus on differences in productivity, both over time and across countries, that 
are not explained by factor accumulation alone. Including time dummies in the estima-
tion then allows for TFP levels to vary over time with trend growth rates that are com-
                                            
10  Here, sit are average years of schooling in the active population; the function φ (s) is piecewise linear 
over years of schooling at different levels; it exhibits decreasing returns to higher education and is thus 
similar to the education-related components of a Mincerian wage regression (see Section 2.1). 
11  See Appendix A.2 for descriptive statistics related to the variables used in the analysis. 
12  To control for cross-country heterogeneity in a rough fashion, M 1 includes dummies for OECD coun-
tries and a subset of “least” developed countries as additional regressors.   11
mon to all the countries considered. Including country-level dummies means that indi-
vidual countries may be away, some more and some less, from the current technology 
frontier defined at a global level. Against this background, additional effects of the L-
variables indicate that the age structure of the labour force may matter for closing, or 
widening, the gap to the world productivity frontier, for instance, by playing a role for 
the adoption and use of new technologies. 
  Model M 4 is very similar to M 3. Now, however, residuals are clustered by coun-
tries as a means to avoid potential distortions of the standard errors through serial corre-
lation. Estimated coefficients are unchanged against M 3, showing a pronounced age-
related pattern of the impact of the L-variables on the log-TFP measure. What is more 
interesting for the moment is that the significance of these effects is next to unaffected. 
Four of the five age-structure variables are significant in the regression relating to all 
countries in the sample. The same is true for an otherwise identical regression based on 
OECD countries only. Additional tests reveal that, in models M 4a and M 4b, all coeffi-
cients of the five L-variables are jointly significant at a 1-percent level for all countries, 
at a 5-percent level in the case of OECD countries.
13 
  The search for an appropriate specification is continued in M 5 and M 6, a genuine 
fixed-effects model and a random-effects model. Apart from the constant, the coeffi-
cients of M 5 are identical to those of M 3 and M 4, and their significance turns out to 
be as high as in M 3, that is, without the adjustment in standard errors through clustered 
residuals. At the same time, the assumption of country-level fixed effects
14 takes away 
some of the explanatory power of the other regressors. In the regression covering all 
countries, this can be seen from the moderate results regarding “R² within” (measuring 
the model’s fit over time for a given country) and the new, combined measure of the 
“overall R²” (over time and across countries); in the OECD regression, the “within” fit 
is still rather high. All these observations are not uncommon in a context like the present 
one. M 6 uses the generalized least squares (GLS) method for analysing an otherwise 
unchanged model. The results are qualitatively unchanged against M 3 through M 5, but 
additional tests do not support the random-effects specification.
15 In the light of these 
results, one may thus consider M 4 – which yields quantitatively the same results as M3 
and M5 – as the final specification of the present TFP-in-levels estimation and use it as 
a baseline for further analyses. 
                                            
13  The F-test on joint significance of all the L-variables rejects the Null hypothesis that they are all equal 
to zero with prob > F = 0.0015 for model M 4a. With M 4b, the test statistic is prob > F = 0.0412. 
14  These effects are jointly significant at a 1-percent level in both versions of model M 5. 
15  The Hausman test rejects that country-specific effects are uncorrelated with the other explanatory vari-
ables. The Breusch-Pagan test confirms that there is no autocorrelation in the country-specific effects. 
Both these results imply that the country-level effects are not randomly distributed.   12
Table 1: The age composition of the labour force and TFP  
 
  M 1  M 2  M 3  (a)        M 4        (b) 
Sample  All Countries  All Countries  All Countries  All Countries  OECD 
Estimation method  Pooled OLS  OLS  OLS  Robust OLS
 a) Robust  OLS
 a) 































L40–49  (ref.  group)       




















Year dummies  –No  –No  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –No  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 






























Observations  –858  –858  –858  –858  –233 
Countries  –106  –106  –106  –106  ––27 
(Adj.) R²  –38.8%  –84.7%  –86.4%  –88.2%  –87.7% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
 
  Moving from level accounting to growth accounting in its original form, I then look 
at equation (7), investigating whether changes in the age composition of the labour force 
have an impact on TFP growth which is in line with the results derived from the level-
equation (6). The new results are summarized in Table 2. Note that none of the estima-
tions allows for a constant. M 7 also does not include country dummies and is thus 
equivalent to the baseline model M 4: the common assumption is that the trend growth 
rate is determined by the global technology frontier and is thus the same across coun-
tries, while labour-force demographics may speed up, or slow down, convergence. The 
alternative model with country dummies, M 8, allows for trend growth rates which per-   13
Table 1 (cont’d.): The age composition of the labour force and TFP   
 
  (a)           M 5            (b)  (a)           M 6            (b) 
Sample  All Countries  OECD  All Countries  OECD 
Estimation method  OLS (fixed effects) OLS (fixed effects) GLS (random eff.)  GLS (random eff.)










































Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 








Observations  –858  –233  –858  –233 
Countries  –106  ––27  –106  ––27 
R² overall  –32.7%  ––5.7%  –35.2%  ––6.4% 
     within  –14.5%  –40.6%  –14.1%  –40.4% 
     between  –35.3%  ––0.1%  –39.5%  ––0.2% 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
 
manently differ across countries, potentially giving demographics an additional role as a 
true driving force of technological progress, not merely a role for technology adoption. 
  Table 2 shows that the results of M 7 are basically in line with those of M 4. In the 
all-countries version of the estimation, three of the five L-variables are significant by 
themselves for explaining TFP growth, and they are jointly significant at a close-to-1-
percent level.
16 Results for the OECD sub-sample are weaker in both respects, suggest-
ing that demographics alone are less important for TFP growth in industrialized coun-
tries than they are in the rest of the world. Most importantly, however, the pattern of the 
L-coefficients, measuring the impact of the age composition of the labour force on the 
growth rate of TFP remains largely unchanged for both samples. Things are different 
                                            
16  The F-test on joint significance of all the L-variables yields prob > F = 0.0153 for model M 7a and 
prob > F = 0.1054 for model M 7b.   14
Table 2: Changes in the age composition of the labour force and TFP growth   
 
  (a)           M 7            (b)  (a)           M 8            (b) 
Sample  All Countries  OECD  All Countries  OECD 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) Robust  OLS
 a) Robust  OLS
 a) Robust  OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 
























∆ L40–49 (ref. group)      
















Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No  –Yes  –Yes 
Observations  –752  –206  –752  –206 
Countries  –102  ––27  –102  ––27 
R²  –8.4%  –33.9%  –23.3%  –42.2% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
 
with respect to M 8, the variant with country dummies. Here, the significance of esti-
mates for the L-variables largely vanishes, and only in the OECD-variant the L-coeffi-
cients still exhibit a clear-cut, age-related pattern. At the same time, most of the country 
dummies turn out to be significant, but the overwhelming majority of the coefficients 
are in a very narrow band ranging from 0.1 to 0.2 in M 8a, from 0.0 to 0.05 in M 8b. It 
appears that, once the impact of demographics on growth performance is controlled for, 
strong cross-country differences in trend growth rates are not supported by the data. 
  To put the results in a broader perspective and test for alternative channels of the 
impact of labour-force demographics on productivity and productivity growth, one 
could also use equations (3) and (4) and regress all of their components on the vector of 
L-variables. The results of these estimations are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
17 All of 
                                            
17  The columns representing results for ln A and ∆ ln A in Tables 3 and 4 are identical with those of mod-
els M 4a, M 4b, M 7a and M 7b, respectively.   15
Table 3: The composition of the impact of demographics on productivity  
 
  (a)                            (b)           M 9           (c)                            (d) 
Sample All  Countries 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 










































Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –Yes – Yes  –Yes  –Yes 








Observations  –858  –858  –858  –858 
Countries  –106  –106  –106  –106 
R²  –96.4%  –88.2%  –86.6%  –96.9% 
  
  (e)                            (f)           M 9           (g)                            (h) 
Sample OECD 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 










































Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –Yes – Yes  –Yes  –Yes 








Observations  –233  –233  –233  –233 
Countries  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27 
R²  –94.6%  –87.7%  –89.3%  –93.8% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.)   16
Table 4: The composition of the impact of demographics on productivity growth 
 
  (a)                           (b)          M 10          (c)                            (d) 
Sample All  Countries 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln q  ∆ ln A  α/(1–α) ∆ ln κ  ∆ ln h 
























∆ L40–49 (ref. group)      
















Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No – No – No 
Observations  –752  –752  –752  –752 
Countries  –102  –102  –102  –102 
R²  –27.7%  –8.4%  –23.6%  –42.4% 
  
  (e)                           (f)          M 10          (g)                            (h) 
Sample OECD 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln q  ∆ ln A  α/(1–α) ∆ ln κ  ∆ ln h 
























∆ L40–49 (ref. group)      
















Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No – No – No 
Observations  –206  –206  –206  –206 
Countries  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27 
R²  –73.6%  –33.9%  –52.3%  –45.0% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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the findings reported there point to a first-order importance of the TFP channel for the 
observed impact of the age composition of the labour force on output per worker and its 
development over time. Note that, by construction, coefficients for ln q and ∆ ln q equal 
the sum of the coefficients related to ln A or ∆ ln A, α/(1–α) ln κ, etc. 
  It is easy to see that the L-coefficients related to TFP are always substantially larger 
than those related to the capital coefficient and human capital. Also, in the estimations 
for κ and h, almost none of the L-coefficients are significant. In fact, they are all insig-
nificant in model M10, i.e., for the variables in first differences. Only in the level-esti-
mate for all countries, the age-structure variable relating to the youngest group of work-
ers, L10–19, yields a significant estimate with respect to the human-capital stock meas-
ure, ln h. In the OECD-version, the same is true with respect to the capital coefficient, 
α/(1–α) ln κ. In both cases, the coefficients are negative. The first of these results is 
easily understood. Outside the OECD world, labour-force participation of young adults 
is sometimes substantial, but this reduces the level of final educational attainments of 
the entire labour force. The second result points to a negative relationship between the 
size of the cohort who is just entering the labour force and the current capital coefficient 
which, in turn, contributes to a lower level of output per worker. Up to a point, this may 
reflect the “capital-dilution” effect of a growing labour force, probably the “baby boom-
ers”, for productivity that was discussed in Section  2. In the current version of the 
model, there may thus be a limited influence of demographics on factor accumulation, 
as was also found by Brandner and Dowrick (1994) or Ahituv (2001), but it appears to 
be next to negligible vis-à-vis the strong impact on total factor productivity. 
  All in all, the findings thus far fully confirm the results obtained by Feyrer (2007), 
based on an up-dated sample and a longer time series, with ten years of additional data 
taken from a period in which, at least in develop countries, growth may have been much 
more regular than in the 1960s. A major result of the estimates is that the coefficients 
for L10–19 through L60+ exhibit a highly remarkable pattern. Age-related contributions 
to TFP and TFP growth clearly peak for workers in their 40s, as the coefficients for 
other age groups turn out to be negative. In the all-countries regressions, the overall 
pattern is in fact of a perfect, inverse U-shape, resembling that of a standard Mincer-
type wage regression. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
18 In the OECD-variant of M 4, the 
pattern is less pronounced in general, and there appears to be a deviation from the in-
verse U-shape related to those aged 20–29. (Note, however, that the point estimate is 
only borderline-significant in this case.) Thus, if one takes age-related wage profiles as 
                                            
18  For a typical Mincerian wage regression, Figure 1 draws on results reported in Fenge et al. (2006), 
based on German micro-data. For illustrative purposes, the age-related relative contributions of each 
age group to the level of TFP are assessed based on the estimates derived from model M 4a above, us-
ing the year-2000 age structure of the German labour force.   18
indicating age-specific productivity differentials that are observable at an individual 
level and can be internalized through wages, the structure of contributions of each age 
group to TFP exhibits a similar structure. Yet, the differential impact on TFP appears to 
be much stronger, pointing to quantitatively important “growth externalities” in an 
overall model of “transitory endogenous growth” by which the age composition of the 
entire labour force of a given country matters a lot for technology adoption and, hence, 
for levels and movements of total factor productivity. 
 
























































Mincerian wage profile (males)
Mincerian wage profile (females)
Age-specific contribution to q via TFP
 
Sources: Fenge et al. (2006) for wage profiles; own calculations based on Model M 4a. 
On the black curve, points representing the results of model M 4a are filled if the underlying estimate is 
significant. The estimate for the 50–59 group is not significant. 
 
4.2 Extensions: Is there a role of cohort effects in human capital? 
For countries that are particularly hard hit by demographic ageing, the above estimates 
predict that expected changes in the age composition of the labour force may temporar-
ily reduce trend TFP growth and trend productivity growth by more than 1 percentage 
point a year. In fact, the findings appear to be so strong and also robust that one might 
be happy to provide reasons why they could be exaggerated or even misleading. Some 
potential problems are already covered in Feyrer (2007). Here, I will briefly discuss 
some major potential sources of error, viz. endogeneity biases, measurement error re-
garding the dependent variable A and an omitted-variable bias. Then, I will look into 
two of the issues that arise which could be really important.   19
  It has already been stated that, unlike many other potential determinants of eco-
nomic growth, the L-regressors can be basically be considered to be exogenous, simply 
because they are to a very large extent determined by fertility decisions taken more than 
a decade ago. Yet, there could be endogenous features that matter for some important 
details. Migration is likely to respond to productivity and productivity growth, even 
though the role of recent migration for the age structure of the entire labour force of a 
given country may be limited. Also, labour-force participation may have an endogenous 
element, even if this need not affect the structure of the L-shares very much. Both these 
potential problems have already been investigated, and largely ruled out, by Feyrer 
(2007), using lagged variables and pure population shares as unbiased instruments.
19 
  As the TFP-measure is determined residually, everything that is not properly ac-
counted for when calculating it, i.e., everything not included in the κ and h-terms in 
equation (3), is – probably wrongly – attributed to A. Here, two aspects of this well-
known problem may deserve a little more attention. First, productivity is defined on per-
worker terms throughout the above calculations. Therefore, if the average number of 
hours worked has declined over time this may create a distortion, mainly affecting cal-
culated changes in TFP. Unfortunately, longer time series of data regarding this issue 
exist only for OECD countries where, at the same time, changes of this kind may have 
been most prominent over the last few decades. Again, it has already been demonstrated 
by Feyrer (2007) that controlling for these changes leaves the structure of coefficients, 
hence the estimated impact of labour-force demographics on TFP growth, unaffected. 
Second, in some countries not only the accumulation of physical and human capital, but 
also the exploitation of natural resources plays a major role for economic development, 
which may again distort the TFP-measure. As a prominent example, one may therefore 
use various definitions to identify oil-exporting countries and exclude them from the 
sample while re-doing the level-estimates based on model M 4. The results are basically 
unchanged against those reported in Table 1.
20 
  Finally, making the TFP residual A dependent on the L-variables goes half way in 
the direction of the Lucas–Uzawa growth model, as I already noted. There is then one 
natural extension of the Feyrer (2007) framework which completes this analogy. Not 
                                            
19  The latter findings are also in line with those of Lindh and Malmberg (1999); see Section 2.2. 
20  See Appendix A.3. If anything, the age-related pattern of TFP-contributions becomes even more pro-
nounced when more and more oil-exporting countries are dropped. Also, the results for the L-variables 
are jointly significant at the 1-percent level in all cases but the last one, where they are only close to 
being so. In this case, the definition of “oil-exporters” is extreme in that it encompasses all countries 
where, more than once in the 1960–2000 period, the share of fuel exports in total merchandise exports 
was in the top third of the annual global distribution of these shares. Since countries where foreign-
trade data are lacking are also omitted, more than half of the observations are lost. Note that Feyrer 
(2007) uses a “non-oil” sample throughout, being more cautious in this respect than necessary.   20
only the age structure of the labour force but also that of their human capital, that is, 
age-specific values of h10–19, h20–29, etc., might affect the TFP measure. In fact, since 
individuals well into their 20s are still in the process of accumulating human capital, 
while older workers often have lower final educational attainments than their succes-
sors, the entire age-related pattern of TFP contributions could therefore, at least partly, 
be driven by cohort effects located in educational attainments. 
  To investigate this idea more closely, data on educational attainments by age groups 
are needed that have the same coverage as the data panel I have been using. So far, data 
of this kind are nowhere provided directly. It is difficult, though possible, however, to 
re-cover such information from the Barro–Lee (2001) dataset I already used to account 
for human-capital accumulation. The data that result from a series of transformations
21 
have a number of limitations. Most importantly, they cannot reflect the full age-related 
variation of educational attainments for the entire sample period, as more and more en-
tries for older age groups have to be set to uniform averages when moving backward in 
                                            
21  The data set on educational attainments constructed by Barro and Lee (2001) offers two series of re-
sults, one for the population aged 15 and above – which I have used in calculating ln h – and one for 
the population aged 25 and above. Educational attainments of those aged 15–24 should therefore be 
given by h15–24 = (h15+ Pop15+ – h25+ Pop25+) / (Pop15–24); detailed population data are taken from the UN 
Population Division’s (2006) data base which shows only minimal deviations from the figures for 
Pop15+ and Pop25+ provided by Barro and Lee (2001). In line with the timing of human-capital accu-
mulation assumed by Barro and Lee (2001, eq. (6)–(9), viz. that 15–19 year olds are beyond primary 
education, half way through secondary education and have no tertiary education; that 20–24-year olds 
are beyond secondary education and half way through tertiary education), one can infer final, or full, 
educational attainments of those currently aged 15–24 and consider these constant from age 25 on-
ward. Thus, c h15–24, t = h25–34, t+10 = h35–44, t+20, etc., where c is a conversion factor which is based on the 
assumptions just mentioned and on the proportions of the relevant age groups. This yields a series of 
educational attainments by age groups which runs from 1960 to 2000 for those aged 15–24 but, unfor-
tunately, covers those aged 55–64 only in the year 2000. In other words, relying on data resulting from 
these transformations only I would largely lose the time-series dimension. 
  To overcome this serious limitation without doing violence to the data that are in place, I therefore 
take a second step. Based on hX+ = (h15+ Pop15+ – h<X Pop<X) / (PopX+) I impute adjusted figures for av-
erage educational attainments to all groups aged X and above for which these data are missing. This 
certainly implies a loss in potential variation across age groups, but does not rely on any additional 
conjectures which might not be supported by the original data. Only, with the population measured in 
1,000s and educational attainments measured as average years of schooling (differentiated by levels) 
with just one decimal digit, this procedure is susceptible to relatively large rounding errors, especially 
where average educational attainments are close to zero. I thus drop a limited number of results that 
are either implausibly low (< –0.2) or exceed the highest figures observed for 2000. Remaining nega-
tive figures are set to zero. Note that, in general, rounding errors should produce noise, but generate no 
systematic biases. In any case, I will also use only non-imputed figures for robustness checks. 
  As the last step to take I switch from results for “odd” age groups (15–24 etc.) to “even” ones (10–19 
etc.) in a straightforward way. Without making any further assumptions regarding cohort effects at the 
level of 5-year age groups, but taking into account the Barro–Lee assumptions regarding the standard-
ized timing of human-capital accumulation, I use population-weighted averages of h15–24 and h25–34 etc. 
for adjacent age groups and determine the end points h15–19 and h60–64 residually. Finally, I take the lat-
ter two results to apply to workers aged 10–19 and 60+, respectively, as labour-force participation 
among those aged less than 15 or 65 and above is usually low.   21
time. Also, the resulting data may effectively convey some noise, especially in the case 
of non-OECD countries where educational attainments are often low and formal educa-
tion processes do not follow a strongly standardized timing. As a further limitation for 
any in-depth analysis, the number of observations I am using is limited from the out-set, 
definitely in the OECD sample, and therefore does not easily allow for introducing a 
multitude of additional regressors. To deal with this problem, I therefore run two series 
of regressions, one where I add a full set of age-specific human-capital variables (h10–
19 through h60+) to the baseline models and one where I use each of these variables in 
turn, but only one at a time. 
 The  h-variables are defined as age-specific educational attainments derived from the 
Barro and Lee (2001) data, converted into a comprehensive human-capital measure fol-
lowing Hall and Jones (1999).
22 They are then divided by the average stock of human 
capital per worker in each country and year in order to remove correlations between 
them and to avoid that, when used in isolation, they are simply a proxy for average hu-
man capital.
23 As a complement of the shares of each age group in the labour force cap-
tured by the regressors L10–19 etc., the h10–19s etc. thus reflect the relative level of 
qualifications of individuals in any of these groups. Tables 5 and 6 report on the results 
of estimations which augment models M 4 and M 7 in the way just described.
24 
  Models M 11 and M 12 which use age-specific measures of human capital as addi-
tional regressors essentially show two things. First, cohort effects in educational attain-
ments appear to play some role in determining both TFP levels and TFP growth. But 
second, they never make the strong age-related pattern of the L-coefficients disappear. 
When the h-variables are thrown in, the age profile for the L-variables becomes less 
pronounced but, at the same time, gets a bit sharper in terms of significance.
25 By them 
selves, the -coefficients show no clear, age-related pattern. Yet, taken in isolation, they 
are jointly significant in the growth-estimates in models M 11h and M 12h and there are 
also a number of significant estimates for human capital of single age groups. 
                                            
22  See footnote 21 on the way the Barro–Lee data are being used and footnote 10 for further details re-
garding the human-capital measure suggested by Hall and Jones (1999). 
23  Regressions on human-capital data without this normalization do not look very different. 
24  For comparison, Appendix A.4 lists the results for Models M 4 and M 7 when, in each case, the sam-
ple is restricted to observations which also enter the human-capital augmented regressions. Also, as 
one may doubt the validity of the imputations of missing human-capital data explained in footnote 21, 
Appendix A.5 reports on parallel regressions using only non-imputed data. To the extent that these re-
sults can be compared at all to those provided in Tables 5 and 6, they are much in line with them. 
25  This can be seen by comparing M 11 and M 12 to their counterparts in Appendix A.4. The L-coeffi-
cients are jointly significant in all of the models M  11a, M  11h, M  12a and M  12h (with prob > 
F = 0.0214, prob > F = 0.0838, prob > F = 0.0360 and prob > F = 0.0353, respectively). They are also 
jointly significant in models M 4g, M 7c and M 7d (with prob > F = 0.0238, prob > F = 0.0480 and 
prob > F = 0.0666, respectively), but not in M 4h.   22
Table 5: The age distribution of human capital and TFP   
 
  (a)              (b)               (c)            M 11 (d)          (e)                (f)              (g) 
Sample All  countries 
Estim. Method  Robust OLS
 a) 












































































     
h20–29  –1.425** 
–(0.618) 
  –0.157 
–(0.156) 
    
h30–39 –1.464** 
–(0.735) 
  –0.003 
–(0.158) 
   
h40–49  –1.330** 
–(0.588) 





    –0.006 
–(0.097) 
 
h60+  –0.187 
–(0.145) 
     – 0 . 0 4 5  
–(0.066) 
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 















Observations  –815  –823  –823  –835  –841  –834  –831 
Countries  –103  –103  –103  –103  –103  –103  –103 
R²  –88.1%  –87.6%  –87.6%  –87.6%  –87.7%  –87.8%  –87.9% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.)   23
Table 5 (cont’d.): The age distribution of human capital and TFP 
 
  (h)              (i)               (j)           M 11 (k)           (l)                (m)             (n) 
Sample OECD 
Estim. Method  Robust OLS
 a) 

















































































    
h30–39  –0.796 
–(0.635) 
  –0.128 
–(0.118) 
   
h40–49 –0.718 
–(0.563) 
   –0.157 
–(0.125) 
  
h50–59  –0.697 
–(0.449) 





     – 0 . 0 3 0  
–(0.061) 
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 















Observations  –217  –219  –219  –225  –231  –228  –228 
Countries  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27 
R²  –88.0%  –88.0%  –87.8%  –87.8%  –88.1%  –87.7%  –87.7% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
   24
Table 6: Changes in the age distribution of human capital and TFP growth 
 
  (a)              (b)               (c)            M 12 (d)          (e)                (f)              (g) 
Sample All  countries 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 










































∆ L40–49 (ref. gr.)         
































     




    
∆ h30–39  –0.920** 
–(0.445) 
  –0.061 
–(0.084) 
   
∆ h40–49  –0.709* 
–(0.371) 
   – 0 . 0 6 0  
–(0.065) 
  
∆ h50–59  –0.623** 
–(0.277) 
    –0.145** 
–(0.069) 
 
∆ h60+  –0.107 
–(0.093) 
     – 0 . 0 6 2  
–(0.046) 
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No  –No – No  –No  –No  –No 
Observations  –701  –714  –714  –731  –738  –726  –721 
Countries  –100  –100  –100  –100  –100  –100  –100 
R²  –10.3%  –8.2%  –9.0%  –8.3%  –8.3%  –8.9%  –8.4% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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Table 6 (cont’d.): Changes in the age distribution of human capital and TFP growth 
 
  (h)              (i)               (j)            M 12 (k)          (l)                (m)             (n) 
Sample OECD 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 










































∆ L40–49 (ref. gr.)         
































     
∆ h20–29  –0.022 
–(0.414) 
  –0.241** 
–(0.093) 
    
∆ h30–39  –0.141 
–(0.444) 
  –0.174* 
–(0.092) 
   
∆ h40–49  –0.240 
–(0.487) 
   –0.006 
–(0.077) 
  
∆ h50–59  –0.137 
–(0.341) 
    –0.128** 
–(0.058) 
 
∆ h60+  –0.097 
–(0.138) 
     – 0 . 0 5 1  
–(0.038) 
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No  –No – No  –No  –No  –No 
Observations  –185  –188  –188  –197  –204  –199  –199 
Countries  ––26  ––26  ––26  ––26  ––26  ––26  ––26 
R²  –38.9%  –34.8%  –35.7%  –33.7%  –32.0%  –34.5%  –34.3% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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  The regressions bundled in Tables 5 and 6 should be read as follows. The columns 
where all the h-variables are present are what I really want to look at. Due to the rela-
tively large number of regressors, however, significance and (insignificant) signs of the 
estimates may be obscured. The additional regressions, each with just one h-variable, 
may therefore serve as robustness checks. Only if results for the hs of single age groups 
are basically the same in both cases, they may be fully trustworthy. Also, because of the 
smaller number of observations, the models generally perform weaker for OECD coun-
tries than they do for the all-countries sample. Besides the finding that the age structure 
of human capital may generally matter for TFP and TFP growth, this leaves us with a 
potentially positive effect relating to human capital of workers in their 20s and a poten-
tially negative effect for workers in their 50s. By the definition of h10–19 etc., these 
results are difficult to interpret, certainly with respect to TFP-levels. Yet, they may re-
flect that relatively high qualifications of younger workers, with those aged 25 usually 
reaching their final level of educational attainments, point to a current improvement in 
human capital; relatively high qualifications of older workers result from a (temporary) 
decline in educational attainments of new labour-market entrants which has been ob-
served in a number of developing countries, especially among former colonies. 
  Up to a point, these extensions beyond purely demographic effects are therefore 
instructive in themselves. In the final analysis, however, they mainly reinforce that there 
is a strong impact, with a particular age-related shape, of labour-force demographics on 
TFP, labour productivity and, hence, on economic growth in general, as was already 
shown in Section 4.1. 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, I have taken a closer look at the potential impact of (changes in) the age 
composition of the labour force, hence (changes in) past fertility rates, on the growth 
performance in a long, multi-country data panel. Building on the limited amount of ex-
isting literature that attempts to address this issue in an empirical framework, I found an 
effect that appears to be surprisingly strong, affecting productivity and productivity 
growth, and therefore goes beyond the simple arithmetic of changes in population size 
and dependency ratios. More specifically, the age composition of a given country’s la-
bour force appears to affect total factor productivity (TFP) and its growth, which are 
generally observed to be the most important sources of variation in economic perform-
ance in the empirical growth literature. The effect thus assumes the features of a phe-
nomenon of (transitory) endogenous growth. 
  An interesting aspect is that the age-related profile of contributions to TFP implies 
that workers in the age group 40–49 are most important for attaining high levels and   27
faster growth of productivity, while the contributions of younger and older workers are 
considerably smaller. In other words, the particular age profile reflected in Mincerian 
wage regressions, which is usually taken to reflect productivity differentials related to 
age or experience, could feed through to TFP through externalities in the invention or, 
probably even more so, in the adoption and utilization of new technologies. This effect 
is indeed much stronger than anything that can be observed at the micro level. Closer 
inspection reveals that cohort effects in educational attainments may contribute, to some 
extent, to shaping this particular age-related pattern. But basically, it does not appear to 
be driven by the age structure of human capital. 
  Demographics exhibit a substantial amount of variation, both over time and across 
countries, even if one limits attention to the small group of highly developed countries. 
This will become even more apparent in the period of overt demographic ageing that is 
currently about to begin, with large cohorts of workers entering retirement and much 
smaller cohorts entering activity or moving to their prime age. The foregoing economet-
ric analyses can therefore be complemented with a number of illustrative simulations 
which show how economic development could be influenced by future demographic 
change in the US, Japan, Germany, the UK, and France, i.e., the five largest OECD 
economies in terms of GDP where expected changes in the structure of the labour force 
as well as the entire population are rather diverse. The estimates based on model M 7 
imply that changes in age composition of the labour force lead to deviations from TFP 
trend growth at a national level, while trend growth as such is basically the same across 
all countries. Using the results obtained for model M 7b (referring to the OECD sam-
ple), I can therefore simulate predicted deviations from trend productivity growth im-
plied in current demographic projections (combined with current age-specific participa-
tion rates which are simply held constant) over the next four decades.
26 I can then com-
bine the results with aggregate figures for employment and total population implied in 
the same projections to translate them into predicted deviations from aggregate trend 
growth and trend growth per capita. The results are illustrated in Figure 2, spanning the 
time period from 1990 to 2050 to see how the predictions relate to actual developments 
over the last fifteen years. 
  According to these simulations, the five countries considered are likely to be af-
fected by changes in the age composition of their labour force in different ways. As to 
                                            
26  Population data and projections are taken from the 2006 release of the “World Population Prospects” 
prepared by the UN Population Division (2007, “constant-fertility” variant). Information regarding 
current activity rates is taken from the ILO (2007) LABORSTA database. Note that simulations de-
rived from the all-countries regression in model M 7a would not be altogether different. Only, due to 
stronger variation in the L-coefficients, the profiles obtained would be even more pronounced than in 
the OECD variant which is used for Figure 2.   28
Figure 2:  The impact of projected demographic change on economic growth   



























































































































































































































































Sources: UN Population Division (2006; 2007), ILO (2007), author’s estimates. 
 
predictions for past and current developments, i.e., in the 1990–2005 sub-period, the 
estimates are able to explain, up to a point, the strong growth in productivity and aggre-
gate output that the US has seen in the 1990s and also the underperformance that Japan 
Productivity growth 
Aggregate output growth 
Per-capita output growth   29
was faced with in the same period. In the UK, above-trend growth in the 1990s and a 
current return to more moderate growth rates could also be derived from the estimates. 
The model works less good for France and Germany, where it predicts above-trend 
growth for the periods from 1990–95 and from 1995 onward to the present, respec-
tively. In particular, the German growth performance has been relatively weak during 
the entire period from 1995 to 2005.
27 
  As to projected developments from 2005 onward, any of the growth rates I am look-
ing at in Figure 2 is likely to exhibit much stronger fluctuations in Germany and Japan 
than it will in France, the UK and the US. Given past fertility trends and their conse-
quences for the projected age composition of the labour force, this is probably not too 
surprising. However, the effects are very strong. The core result directly derived from 
the econometric estimates presented in Section 4.1 is that Germany as well as Japan 
may be faced with continued swings, both up and down, in productivity growth that 
could reach, or even exceed, 1 percentage point per year. Developments differ between 
these two countries because Japan had an early, and rather strong, post-war baby boom 
and a two-stage decline in birth rates afterwards,
28 while the German baby boom was 
late and rather weak, followed by a very fast reduction in birth rates. In both cases, the 
resulting shifts in the demographic structure of the working-age population are becom-
ing smaller over time, but last until around 2040. France, the UK and also the US will 
have a labour force with a relatively stable age structure, once the cohorts of their baby 
boomers have retired. The US, with a much stronger and more long-lasting baby boom 
than elsewhere, will have to deal with substantial changes in the age structure of their 
labour force over the next ten to fifteen years; thereafter, the effect will fade out. In the 
UK the baby boom was again smaller and took place later, giving rise to limited swings 
until around 2030. In France, where after an early and rather strong baby room birth 
rates never fell very low, there will be virtually no deviations from trend productivity 
growth caused by demographic shifts from 2005 onwards. 
  Taking into account the “participation” and “dependency” effects discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1, the simulated changes in productivity growth translate into trend deviations in 
                                            
27  A possible interpretation is that, due to a number of structural problems, Germany has effectively been 
forgoing the opportunity of some demographically induced extra-growth when the German baby 
boomers entered their 40s. By contrast, the US may have been able to exploit a similar opportunity 
during the 1990s, among other things because of their flexible labour markets. Of course, this reason-
ing does by no means imply that the same rigidities could also isolate a country against the downward 
risks for growth performance resulting from demographic changes projected for the future. 
28  In a sense, Japan has gone through the “first stage” of demographic transition, with a reduction in birth 
rates to a “replacement level” only in the short period between 1945 and 1955, while the same had 
happened around the beginning of the 20
th century in most other developed countries. As elsewhere, 
the Japanese birth rate started falling again in the mid-1970s – slower, but eventually to a lower level, 
than in Germany and, a fortiori, in the most other developed countries.   30
the rates of aggregate growth and per-capita growth. In the US, the predicted demo-
graphic impact on aggregate growth is positive almost throughout, as the labour force in 
this country is projected to increase almost throughout, setting off all adverse effects for 
productivity. However, per-capita growth is negatively affected, due to an increase in 
dependency. In Germany and Japan, future reductions in aggregate growth are more 
pronounced than those in per-capita growth because, in these two countries, even total 
population is expected to decline, although at a smaller rate than their labour force. In 
any of these cases, the effects on output per capita are of course more important than 
those for aggregate output (see, again, Section 2.1). Also, it is interesting to note that the 
simulated impact of demographics on economic performance is not necessarily only a 
concern for the very long term. In Germany, assuming a common trend growth rate of 
productivity of about 1.5 per cent p.a. on real terms (which is about the average rate of 
annual real productivity growth in industrialized countries since 1990; see OECD 2007), 
demographic ageing could take away virtually all real growth of per-capita output in the 
period between 2010 and 2020. By contrast, the medium-term outlook for Japan appears 
to be a lot more friendly. 
  Because of the nature of macro-level evidence brought forth here, the foregoing 
analysis is certainly rough in many respects and one needs to interpret the findings with 
some care. Also, the analysis provides little detail that could be helpful in identifying 
the mechanisms at work behind the results, even though there are good reasons to inves-
tigate age-related productivity differentials using macroeconomic data (see Section 2.3). 
The results essentially support this view as they highlight a strong role of labour-force 
demographics for TFP and its growth. However, one can only speculate as to why this is 
so, while the estimates by themselves say nothing on how to answer this question. There 
are a number of plausible stories which could help explaining the observed pattern and, 
hence, might deserve further examination. Essentially, though, they would have to be 
investigated in a different framework and, more importantly, at another level. For ex-
ample, the aggregate-level findings in this study could reflect effects of the age compo-
sition of work teams which originate at the firm level. The specific education–experi-
ence mix, or simply the way in which members of different age groups interact with 
each other in such teams, could easily matter for their total productivity. There could be 
other factors, such as entrepreneurship, creativity or simply pragmatism, which give 
prime-aged individuals a particular weight in determining TFP and TFP growth through 
the creation of new inventions or their successful exploitation. Starting from intriguing 
measurement problems, it would certainly not be easy to conceptualize and really inves-
tigate these issues. Still, the results derived in this paper may effectively define a re-
search agenda that ought to be tackled when further exploring the economic implica-
tions of demographic ageing.   31
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Appendix 
A.1 List of countries included in the sample 
OECD countries (27): Non-OECD  countries  (79): 
Australia Afghanistan  Guatemala  Papua  New  Guinea 
Austria Algeria Guinea-Bissau  Paraguay 
Belgium Argentina  Haiti  Peru 
Canada Bahrain    Honduras  Philippines 
Denmark Bangladesh  Hong  Kong  Rwanda 
Finland Barbados  India  Senegal 
France Benin  Indonesia  Sierra  Leone 
Germany Bolivia  Iran  Singapore 
Greece Botswana  Iraq  South  Africa 
Hungary Brazil  Israel  Sri  Lanka 
Iceland Burundi  Jamaica  Sudan 
Ireland Chile  Jordan Swaziland 
Italy China  Kenya  Syria 
Japan Cameroon  Kuwait  Tanzania 
Korea, Rep. of  Central African Rep.  Liberia  Thailand 
Mexico Colombia  Lesotho Togo 
Netherlands Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  Malawi Trinidad  &  Tobago 
New Zealand  Congo, Rep. of  Malaysia  Tunisia 
Norway Costa  Rica  Mali  Uganda 
Poland Cyprus Mauritania  United Arab Emirates 
Portugal Dominican  Rep.  Mauritius  Uruguay 
Spain Ecuador  Mozambique  Venezuela 
Sweden Egypt  Nicaragua  Yemen 
Switzerland El  Salvador Niger  Zambia 
Turkey Fiji  Nepal  Zimbabwe 
United Kingdom  Gambia  Pakistan   
United States  Ghana  Panama   
With data spanning the period from 1960 to 2000 at 5-year intervals, the maximum number of observa-
tions for each country is 9. The average number of observations which enter the level-estimates reported 
in Section 4.1 is 8.1 for the “all countries” sample, 8.6 for the OECD sample. In the growth-estimates that 
follow, differencing implies a reduction by one observation per country (while countries with just one 
observation drop out). Here the average number of observations is 7.4 and 7.6, respectively. For several 
reasons, sample size is further reduced in terms of countries and/or observations in the estimates reported 
in Section 4.2 and in the appendix. 
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A.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean  Std.  dev.  Min.  Max. 
Growth  accounting:     
   q (real GDP per worker, US-$)  17,214  16,786  487  196,173 
   κ (capital coefficient)  1.3623  0.8195  0.0892  6.2989 
   ln h (log measure of hum. cap.)  0.6056  0.3351  0.0141  1.3962 
   ln A (log TFP measure)  8.5801  0.7995  5.0615  12.4691 
Labour force by age groups:         
   L10–19 (share in total L)  0.1535 0.0699 0.0031 0.3063 
   L20–29 (share in total L)  0.2806 0.0370 0.1780 0.4380 
   L30–39 (share in total L)  0.2247 0.0343 0.1213 0.4046 
   L40–49 (share in total L)  0.1674 0.0350 0.1041 0.3010 
   L50–59 (share in total L)  0.1105 0.0296 0.0596 0.2243 
   L60plus (share in total L)  0.0633 0.0209 0.0039 0.1583 
Human capital by age groups:         
   h10–19 (relative to ln h)  1.2691 0.3692 0.1972 3.4578 
   h20–29 (relative to ln h)  1.2311 0.1870 0.6966 2.2302 
   h30–39 (relative to ln h)  0.9895 0.1969 0.3649 2.1448 
   h40–49 (relative to ln h)  0.8237 0.2256 0.0000 1.7753 
   h50–59 (relative to ln h)  0.7515 0.2646 0.0000 1.8850 
   h60plus (relative to ln h)  0.7416 0.3923 0.0000 2.7021 
       
Correlation Matrices 
  –ln A  –ln q  –ln κ  –ln h    
ln A  –1.0000       
ln q  –0.8376  –1.0000        
ln κ  –0.0336  –0.5339  –1.0000      
ln h  –0.3804  –0.7727  –0.6296  –1.0000    
  –ln A  –L1019  –L2029  –L3039  –L4049  –L5059 
ln A  –1.0000       
L1019 –0.5381  –1.0000        
L2029  –0.0644  –0.0246  –1.0000      
L3039  –0.4073 –0.7427 –0.1118  –1.0000    
L4049  –0.4193 –0.8091 –0.4695 –0.5744  –1.0000  
L5059  –0.3228 –0.6403 –0.5953 –0.1408  –0.7332  –1.0000 
L60plus –0.1405  –0.0950 –0.3970 –0.5220 –0.1243 –0.3195 
  –ln h  –h1019  –h2029  –h3039  –h4049  –h5059 
ln h  –1.0000       
h1019 –0.5920  –1.0000        
h2029 –0.3288  –0.5438  –1.0000      
h3030  –0.3359 –0.5816 –0.1993  –1.0000    
h4049  –0.5076 –0.6442 –0.6200 –0.4562  –1.0000  
5059  –0.4363 –0.4899 –0.8128 –0.1815 –0.6679  –1.0000 
h60plus  –0.2625 –0.2857 –0.6246 –0.3363 –0.2016  –0.7360 
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A.3 The age composition of the labour force and TFP:  
estimates for “non-oil” samples 
  (c)                             (d)           M 4           (e)                              (f) 
Sample Non-oil  90%
 a) Non-oil  80%
 a) Non-oil  75%
 a) Non-oil  66,7%
 a) 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) 










































Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –Yes – Yes  –Yes  –Yes 








Observations  –745  –602  –505  –405 
Countries  ––90  ––73  ––62  ––49 
R²  –88.9%  –89.0%  –87.8%  –88.2% 
a) “Non-oil  X%” means that countries are excluded if, in the 1960–2000 period, the share of fuel exports 
in total merchandise exports was more than once at or above the X
th percentile of the annual global dis-
tribution of these shares. Countries for which data on foreign trade are lacking are also omitted. 
b)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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A.4 The age composition of the labour force, TFP and TFP growth: 
estimates for the samples with detailed human-capital data 
  (g)          M 4          (h)  (c)          M 7          (d) 
Sample All  countries
 a) OECD
 a) All  countries
 a) OECD
 a) 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) 
Dep. variable:  ln A ln  A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 
























(∆) L40–49 (ref. group)      
















Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –Yes – Yes  –No  –No 





Observations  –815  –217  –701  –185 
Countries  –103  ––27  –100  ––26 
R²  –87.8%  –87.6%  –7.4%  –34.9% 
a)  Samples restricted to observations for which data on the age composition of human capital as used in 
models M 11 and M 12 are available. 
b)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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A.5 The age distribution of human capital, TFP and TFP growth: 
estimates without imputed figures for age-specific human capital 
  (a)               (b)               (c)            M 13 (d)          (e)                (f)               (g) 
Sample All  countries
 a) 
Estim. method  Pool. OLS  Robust OLS
 b) Pooled  OLS 












































































     
h20–29  –0.709 
–(1.815) 
  –0.156 
–(0.153) 
    
h30–39 –0.671 
–(2.385) 
  –0.132 
–(0.167) 
   
h40–49 –1.389 
–(2.040) 
   –0.153 
–(0.171) 
  
h50–59  –1.688 
–(1.335) 





     – 0 . 0 5 5  
–(0.184) 
Year dummies  –No – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – No – No 















Observations  ––86  –661  –660  –469  –276  ––91  ––91 
Countries  ––86  –100  –100  ––99  ––96  ––91  ––91 
R²  –63.8%  –88.9%  –88.8%  –92.8%  –96.3%  –60.1%  –60.1% 
a) Samples restricted to observations for which data on the age composition of human capital are avail-
able that have not been imputed based on Step 2 of the procedures explained in footnote 21. 
b) Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.)   38
A.5 (cont’d.) The age distribution of human capital, TFP and TFP growth: 
estimates without imputed figures for age-specific human capital 
  (a)                  (b)                 (c)     M 14     (d)                  (e)                  (f) 
Sample All  countries
 a) 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 b) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 




































∆ L40–49 (ref. gr.)        






























   




  –0.338*** 
–(0.108) 
  




  –0.053 
–(0.134) 
 
∆ h40–49    –0.036 
–(0.209) 
   –0.124 
–(0.119) 
∆ h50–59        
∆ h60+        
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No  –No – No  –No  –No 
Observations  –360  –172  –556  –555  –368  –180 
Countries  ––96  ––87  –100  ––99  ––98  ––92 
R²  –14.6%  –30.2%  –8.5%  –10.4%  –13.5%  –28.0% 
a) Samples restricted to observations for which data on the age composition of human capital are avail-
able that have not been imputed based on Step 2 of the procedures explained in footnote 21. 
b) Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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